fire as having a nature which fits it to move things, and water and
earth and such things they treat in the contrary way.

    When these men and the principles of this kind had had their
day, as the latter were found inadequate to generate the nature of
things men were again forced by the truth itself, as we said, to
inquire into the next kind of cause. For it is not likely either
that fire or earth or any such element should be the reason why things
manifest goodness and, beauty both in their being and in their
coming to be, or that those thinkers should have supposed it was;
nor again could it be right to entrust so great a matter to
spontaneity and chance. When one man said, then, that reason was
present-as in animals, so throughout nature-as the cause of order
and of all arrangement, he seemed like a sober man in contrast with
the random talk of his predecessors. We know that Anaxagoras certainly
adopted these views, but Hermotimus of Clazomenae is credited with
expressing them earlier. Those who thought thus stated that there is a
principle of things which is at the same time the cause of beauty, and
that sort of cause from which things acquire movement.

                                   4

    One might suspect that Hesiod was the first to look for such a
thing-or some one else who put love or desire among existing things as
a principle, as Parmenides, too, does; for he, in constructing the
genesis of the universe, says:-

          Love first of all the Gods she planned.

    And Hesiod says:-

          First of all things was chaos made, and then

          Broad-breasted earth...

          And love, 'mid all the gods pre-eminent,

  which implies that among existing things there must be from the
first a cause which will move things and bring them together. How
these thinkers should be arranged with regard to priority of discovery
let us be allowed to decide later; but since the contraries of the
various forms of good were also perceived to be present in
nature-not only order and the beautiful, but also disorder and the
ugly, and bad things in greater number than good, and ignoble things
than beautiful-therefore another thinker introduced friendship and
strife, each of the two the cause of one of these two sets of
qualities. For if we were to follow out the view of Empedocles, and
interpret it according to its meaning and not to its lisping
expression, we should find that friendship is the cause of good
things, and strife of bad. Therefore, if we said that Empedocles in
a sense both mentions, and is the first to mention, the bad and the
good as principles, we should perhaps be right, since the cause of all
goods is the good itself.

    These thinkers, as we say, evidently grasped, and to this
extent, two of the causes which we distinguished in our work on
nature-the matter and the source of the movement-vaguely, however, and
with no clearness, but as untrained men behave in fights; for they
go round their opponents and often strike fine blows, but they do
not fight on scientific principles, and so too these thinkers do not
seem to know what they say; for it is evident that, as a rule, they
make no use of their causes except to a small extent. For Anaxagoras
uses reason as a deus ex machina for the making of the world, and when
he is at a loss to tell from what cause something necessarily is, then
he drags reason in, but in all other cases ascribes events to anything
rather than to reason. And Empedocles, though he uses the causes to
a greater extent than this, neither does so sufficiently nor attains
consistency in their use. At least, in many cases he makes love
segregate things, and strife aggregate them. For whenever the universe
is dissolved into its elements by strife, fire is aggregated into one,
and so is each of the other elements; but whenever again under the
influence of love they come together into one, the parts must again be
segregated out of each element.

    Empedocles, then, in contrast with his precessors, was the first
to introduce the dividing of this cause, not positing one source of
movement, but different and contrary sources. Again, he was the
first to speak of four material elements; yet he does not use four,
but treats them as two only; he treats fire by itself, and its
opposite-earth, air, and water-as one kind of thing. We may learn this
by study of his verses.

    This philosopher then, as we say, has spoken of the principles
in this way, and made them of this number. Leucippus and his associate
Democritus say that the full and the empty are the elements, calling
the one being and the other non-being-the full and solid being
being, the empty non-being (whence they say being no more is than
non-being, because the solid no more is than the empty); and they make
these the material causes of things. And as those who make the
underlying substance one generate all other things by its
modifications, supposing the rare and the dense to be the sources of
the modifications, in the same way these philosophers say the
differences in the elements are the causes of all other qualities.
These differences, they say, are three-shape and order and position.
For they say the real is differentiated only by 'rhythm and
'inter-contact' and 'turning'; and of these rhythm is shape,
inter-contact is order, and turning is position; for A differs from
N in shape, AN from NA in order, M from W in position. The question of
movement-whence or how it is to belong to things-these thinkers,
like the others, lazily neglected.