accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of others,
like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods of Hephaestus, which,
says the poet,

     of their own accord entered the assembly of the Gods;

if, in like manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the
lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want
servants, nor masters slaves. Here, however, another distinction
must be drawn; the instruments commonly so called are instruments of
production, whilst a possession is an instrument of action. The
shuttle, for example, is not only of use; but something else is made
by it, whereas of a garment or of a bed there is only the use.
Further, as production and action are different in kind, and both
require instruments, the instruments which they employ must likewise
differ in kind. But life is action and not production, and therefore
the slave is the minister of action. Again, a possession is spoken
of as a part is spoken of; for the part is not only a part of
something else, but wholly belongs to it; and this is also true of a
possession. The master is only the master of the slave; he does not
belong to him, whereas the slave is not only the slave of his
master, but wholly belongs to him. Hence we see what is the nature and
office of a slave; he who is by nature not his own but another's
man, is by nature a slave; and he may be said to be another's man who,
being a human being, is also a possession. And a possession may be
defined as an instrument of action, separable from the possessor.

                                    V

  But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and
for whom such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all
slavery a violation of nature?

  There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both
of reason and of fact. For that some should rule and others be ruled
is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their
birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule.

  And there are many kinds both of rulers and subjects (and that
rule is the better which is exercised over better subjects- for
example, to rule over men is better than to rule over wild beasts; for
the work is better which is executed by better workmen, and where
one man rules and another is ruled, they may be said to have a
work); for in all things which form a composite whole and which are
made up of parts, whether continuous or discrete, a distinction
between the ruling and the subject element comes to fight. Such a
duality exists in living creatures, but not in them only; it
originates in the constitution of the universe; even in things which
have no life there is a ruling principle, as in a musical mode. But we
are wandering from the subject. We will therefore restrict ourselves
to the living creature, which, in the first place, consists of soul
and body: and of these two, the one is by nature the ruler, and the
other the subject. But then we must look for the intentions of
nature in things which retain their nature, and not in things which
are corrupted. And therefore we must study the man who is in the
most perfect state both of body and soul, for in him we shall see
the true relation of the two; although in bad or corrupted natures the
body will often appear to rule over the soul, because they are in an
evil and unnatural condition. At all events we may firstly observe
in living creatures both a despotical and a constitutional rule; for
the soul rules the body with a despotical rule, whereas the
intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional and royal rule.
And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the
mind and the rational element over the passionate, is natural and
expedient; whereas the equality of the two or the rule of the inferior
is always hurtful. The same holds good of animals in relation to
men; for tame animals have a better nature than wild, and all tame
animals are better off when they are ruled by man; for then they are
preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female
inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle,
of necessity, extends to all mankind.

  Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body,
or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business
is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort
are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors
that they should be under the rule of a master. For he who can be, and
therefore is, another's and he who participates in rational
principle enough to apprehend, but not to have, such a principle, is a
slave by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend a
principle; they obey their instincts. And indeed the use made of
slaves and of tame animals is not very different; for both with
their bodies minister to the needs of life. Nature would like to
distinguish between the bodies of freemen and slaves, making the one
strong for servile labor, the other upright, and although useless
for such services, useful for political life in the arts both of war
and peace. But the opposite often happens- that some have the souls
and others have the bodies of freemen. And doubtless if men differed
from one another in the mere forms of their bodies as much as the
statues of the Gods do from men, all would acknowledge that the
inferior class should be slaves of the superior. And if this is true
of the body, how much more just that a similar distinction should
exist in the soul? but the beauty of the body is seen, whereas the
beauty of the soul is not seen. It is clear, then, that some men are
by nature free, and others slaves, and that for these latter slavery
is both expedient and right.

                                    VI

  But that those who take the opposite view have in a certain way