Silence is a woman's glory,

but this is not equally the glory of man. The child is imperfect,
and therefore obviously his virtue is not relative to himself alone,
but to the perfect man and to his teacher, and in like manner the
virtue of the slave is relative to a master. Now we determined that
a slave is useful for the wants of life, and therefore he will
obviously require only so much virtue as will prevent him from failing
in his duty through cowardice or lack of self-control. Some one will
ask whether, if what we are saying is true, virtue will not be
required also in the artisans, for they often fail in their work
through the lack of self control? But is there not a great
difference in the two cases? For the slave shares in his master's
life; the artisan is less closely connected with him, and only attains
excellence in proportion as he becomes a slave. The meaner sort of
mechanic has a special and separate slavery; and whereas the slave
exists by nature, not so the shoemaker or other artisan. It is
manifest, then, that the master ought to be the source of such
excellence in the slave, and not a mere possessor of the art of
mastership which trains the slave in his duties. Wherefore they are
mistaken who forbid us to converse with slaves and say that we
should employ command only, for slaves stand even more in need of
admonition than children.

  So much for this subject; the relations of husband and wife,
parent and child, their several virtues, what in their intercourse
with one another is good, and what is evil, and how we may pursue
the good and good and escape the evil, will have to be discussed
when we speak of the different forms of government. For, inasmuch as
every family is a part of a state, and these relationships are the
parts of a family, and the virtue of the part must have regard to
the virtue of the whole, women and children must be trained by
education with an eye to the constitution, if the virtues of either of
them are supposed to make any difference in the virtues of the
state. And they must make a difference: for the children grow up to be
citizens, and half the free persons in a state are women.

  Of these matters, enough has been said; of what remains, let us
speak at another time. Regarding, then, our present inquiry as
complete, we will make a new beginning. And, first, let us examine the
various theories of a perfect state.

                                 BOOK TWO

                                    I

  OUR PURPOSE is to consider what form of political community is
best of all for those who are most able to realize their ideal of
life. We must therefore examine not only this but other constitutions,
both such as actually exist in well-governed states, and any
theoretical forms which are held in esteem; that what is good and
useful may be brought to light. And let no one suppose that in seeking
for something beyond them we are anxious to make a sophistical display
at any cost; we only undertake this inquiry because all the
constitutions with which we are acquainted are faulty.

  We will begin with the natural beginning of the subject. Three
alternatives are conceivable: The members of a state must either
have (1) all things or (2) nothing in common, or (3) some things in
common and some not. That they should have nothing in common is
clearly impossible, for the constitution is a community, and must at
any rate have a common place- one city will be in one place, and the
citizens are those who share in that one city. But should a well
ordered state have all things, as far as may be, in common, or some
only and not others? For the citizens might conceivably have wives and
children and property in common, as Socrates proposes in the
Republic of Plato. Which is better, our present condition, or the
proposed new order of society.

                                    II

  There are many difficulties in the community of women. And the
principle on which Socrates rests the necessity of such an institution
evidently is not established by his arguments. Further, as a means
to the end which he ascribes to the state, the scheme, taken literally
is impracticable, and how we are to interpret it is nowhere
precisely stated. I am speaking of the premise from which the argument
of Socrates proceeds, 'that the greater the unity of the state the
better.' Is it not obvious that a state may at length attain such a
degree of unity as to be no longer a state? since the nature of a
state is to be a plurality, and in tending to greater unity, from
being a state, it becomes a family, and from being a family, an
individual; for the family may be said to be more than the state,
and the individual than the family. So that we ought not to attain
this greatest unity even if we could, for it would be the
destruction of the state. Again, a state is not made up only of so
many men, but of different kinds of men; for similars do not
constitute a state. It is not like a military alliance The
usefulness of the latter depends upon its quantity even where there is
no difference in quality (for mutual protection is the end aimed
at), just as a greater weight of anything is more useful than a less
(in like manner, a state differs from a nation, when the nation has
not its population organized in villages, but lives an Arcadian sort
of life); but the elements out of which a unity is to be formed differ
in kind. Wherefore the principle of compensation, as I have already
remarked in the Ethics, is the salvation of states. Even among freemen
and equals this is a principle which must be maintained, for they
cannot an rule together, but must change at the end of a year or
some other period of time or in some order of succession. The result
is that upon this plan they all govern; just as if shoemakers and