Since only possible actions, and not impossible ones, can ever
have been done in the past or the present, and since things which have
not occurred, or will not occur, also cannot have been done or be
going to be done, it is necessary for the political, the forensic, and
the ceremonial speaker alike to be able to have at their command
propositions about the possible and the impossible, and about
whether a thing has or has not occurred, will or will not occur.
Further, all men, in giving praise or blame, in urging us to accept or
reject proposals for action, in accusing others or defending
themselves, attempt not only to prove the points mentioned but also to
show that the good or the harm, the honour or disgrace, the justice or
injustice, is great or small, either absolutely or relatively; and
therefore it is plain that we must also have at our command
propositions about greatness or smallness and the greater or the
lesser-propositions both universal and particular. Thus, we must be
able to say which is the greater or lesser good, the greater or lesser
act of justice or injustice; and so on.

  Such, then, are the subjects regarding which we are inevitably bound
to master the propositions relevant to them. We must now discuss
each particular class of these subjects in turn, namely those dealt
with in political, in ceremonial, and lastly in legal, oratory.

                                 4

  First, then, we must ascertain what are the kinds of things, good or
bad, about which the political orator offers counsel. For he does
not deal with all things, but only with such as may or may not take
place. Concerning things which exist or will exist inevitably, or
which cannot possibly exist or take place, no counsel can be given.
Nor, again, can counsel be given about the whole class of things which
may or may not take place; for this class includes some good things
that occur naturally, and some that occur by accident; and about these
it is useless to offer counsel. Clearly counsel can only be given on
matters about which people deliberate; matters, namely, that
ultimately depend on ourselves, and which we have it in our power to
set going. For we turn a thing over in our mind until we have
reached the point of seeing whether we can do it or not.

  Now to enumerate and classify accurately the usual subjects of
public business, and further to frame, as far as possible, true
definitions of them is a task which we must not attempt on the present
occasion. For it does not belong to the art of rhetoric, but to a more
instructive art and a more real branch of knowledge; and as it is,
rhetoric has been given a far wider subject-matter than strictly
belongs to it. The truth is, as indeed we have said already, that
rhetoric is a combination of the science of logic and of the ethical
branch of politics; and it is partly like dialectic, partly like
sophistical reasoning. But the more we try to make either dialectic
rhetoric not, what they really are, practical faculties, but sciences,
the more we shall inadvertently be destroying their true nature; for
we shall be re-fashioning them and shall be passing into the region of
sciences dealing with definite subjects rather than simply with
words and forms of reasoning. Even here, however, we will mention
those points which it is of practical importance to distinguish, their
fuller treatment falling naturally to political science.

  The main matters on which all men deliberate and on which
political speakers make speeches are some five in number: ways and
means, war and peace, national defence, imports and exports, and
legislation.

  As to Ways and Means, then, the intending speaker will need to
know the number and extent of the country's sources of revenue, so
that, if any is being overlooked, it may be added, and, if any is
defective, it may be increased. Further, he should know all the
expenditure of the country, in order that, if any part of it is
superfluous, it may be abolished, or, if any is too large, it may be
reduced. For men become richer not only by increasing their existing
wealth but also by reducing their expenditure. A comprehensive view of
these questions cannot be gained solely from experience in home
affairs; in order to advise on such matters a man must be keenly
interested in the methods worked out in other lands.

  As to Peace and War, he must know the extent of the military
strength of his country, both actual and potential, and also the
mature of that actual and potential strength; and further, what wars
his country has waged, and how it has waged them. He must know these
facts not only about his own country, but also about neighbouring
countries; and also about countries with which war is likely, in order
that peace may be maintained with those stronger than his own, and
that his own may have power to make war or not against those that
are weaker. He should know, too, whether the military power of another
country is like or unlike that of his own; for this is a matter that
may affect their relative strength. With the same end in view he must,
besides, have studied the wars of other countries as well as those
of his own, and the way they ended; similar causes are likely to
have similar results.

  With regard to National Defence: he ought to know all about the
methods of defence in actual use, such as the strength and character
of the defensive force and the positions of the forts-this last
means that he must be well acquainted with the lie of the country-in
order that a garrison may be increased if it is too small or removed
if it is not wanted, and that the strategic points may be guarded with
special care.

  With regard to the Food Supply: he must know what outlay will meet
the needs of his country; what kinds of food are produced at home
and what imported; and what articles must be exported or imported.