It is now plain what our aims, future or actual, should be in
urging, and what in depreciating, a proposal; the latter being the
opposite of the former. Now the political or deliberative orator's aim
is utility: deliberation seeks to determine not ends but the means
to ends, i.e. what it is most useful to do. Further, utility is a good
thing. We ought therefore to assure ourselves of the main facts
about Goodness and Utility in general.

  We may define a good thing as that which ought to be chosen for
its own sake; or as that for the sake of which we choose something
else; or as that which is sought after by all things, or by all things
that have sensation or reason, or which will be sought after by any
things that acquire reason; or as that which must be prescribed for
a given individual by reason generally, or is prescribed for him by
his individual reason, this being his individual good; or as that
whose presence brings anything into a satisfactory and
self-sufficing condition; or as self-sufficiency; or as what produces,
maintains, or entails characteristics of this kind, while preventing
and destroying their opposites. One thing may entail another in either
of two ways-(1) simultaneously, (2) subsequently. Thus learning
entails knowledge subsequently, health entails life simultaneously.
Things are productive of other things in three senses: first as
being healthy produces health; secondly, as food produces health;
and thirdly, as exercise does-i.e. it does so usually. All this
being settled, we now see that both the acquisition of good things and
the removal of bad things must be good; the latter entails freedom
from the evil things simultaneously, while the former entails
possession of the good things subsequently. The acquisition of a
greater in place of a lesser good, or of a lesser in place of a
greater evil, is also good, for in proportion as the greater exceeds
the lesser there is acquisition of good or removal of evil. The
virtues, too, must be something good; for it is by possessing these
that we are in a good condition, and they tend to produce good works
and good actions. They must be severally named and described
elsewhere. Pleasure, again, must be a good thing, since it is the
nature of all animals to aim at it. Consequently both pleasant and
beautiful things must be good things, since the former are
productive of pleasure, while of the beautiful things some are
pleasant and some desirable in and for themselves.

  The following is a more detailed list of things that must be good.
Happiness, as being desirable in itself and sufficient by itself,
and as being that for whose sake we choose many other things. Also
justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence, and all
such qualities, as being excellences of the soul. Further, health,
beauty, and the like, as being bodily excellences and productive of
many other good things: for instance, health is productive both of
pleasure and of life, and therefore is thought the greatest of
goods, since these two things which it causes, pleasure and life,
are two of the things most highly prized by ordinary people. Wealth,
again: for it is the excellence of possession, and also productive
of many other good things. Friends and friendship: for a friend is
desirable in himself and also productive of many other good things.
So, too, honour and reputation, as being pleasant, and productive of
many other good things, and usually accompanied by the presence of the
good things that cause them to be bestowed. The faculty of speech
and action; since all such qualities are productive of what is good.
Further-good parts, strong memory, receptiveness, quickness of
intuition, and the like, for all such faculties are productive of what
is good. Similarly, all the sciences and arts. And life: since, even
if no other good were the result of life, it is desirable in itself.
And justice, as the cause of good to the community.

  The above are pretty well all the things admittedly good. In dealing
with things whose goodness is disputed, we may argue in the
following ways:-That is good of which the contrary is bad. That is
good the contrary of which is to the advantage of our enemies; for
example, if it is to the particular advantage of our enemies that we
should be cowards, clearly courage is of particular value to our
countrymen. And generally, the contrary of that which our enemies
desire, or of that at which they rejoice, is evidently valuable. Hence
the passage beginning:

        Surely would Priam exult.

  This principle usually holds good, but not always, since it may well
be that our interest is sometimes the same as that of our enemies.
Hence it is said that 'evils draw men together'; that is, when the
same thing is hurtful to them both.

  Further: that which is not in excess is good, and that which is
greater than it should be is bad. That also is good on which much
labour or money has been spent; the mere fact of this makes it seem
good, and such a good is assumed to be an end-an end reached through a
long chain of means; and any end is a good. Hence the lines beginning:

        And for Priam (and Troy-town's folk) should

                they leave behind them a boast;

and

        Oh, it were shame

        To have tarried so long and return empty-handed

                as erst we came;

and there is also the proverb about 'breaking the pitcher at the