said, we are deliberating about the most important of our concerns.
I hope that you will see fit to comply with our request.

  Nic. I see very clearly, Lysimachus, that you have only known
Socrates' father, and have no acquaintance with Socrates himself: at
least, you can only have known him when he was a child, and may have
met him among his fellow wardsmen, in company with his father, at a
sacrifice, or at some other gathering. You clearly show that you
have never known him since he arrived at manhood.

  Lys. Why do you say that, Nicias?

  Nic. Because you seem not to be aware that any one who has an
intellectual affinity to Socrates and enters into conversation with
him is liable to be drawn into an argument; and whatever subject he
may start, he will be continually carried round and round by him,
until at last he finds that he has to give an account both of his
present and past life; and when he is once entangled, Socrates will
not let him go until he has completely and thoroughly sifted him.
Now I am used to his ways; and I know that he will certainly do as I
say, and also that I myself shall be the sufferer; for I am fond of
his conversation, Lysimachus. And I think that there is no harm in
being reminded of any wrong thing which we are, or have been, doing:
he who does not fly from reproof will be sure to take more heed of his
after-life; as Solon says, he will wish and desire to be learning so
long as he lives, and will not think that old age of itself brings
wisdom. To me, to be cross examined by Socrates is neither unusual nor
unpleasant; indeed, I knew all along that where Socrates was, the
argument would soon pass from our sons to ourselves; and therefore,
I say that for my part, I am quite willing to discourse with
Socrates in his own manner; but you had better ask our friend Laches
what his feeling may be.

  La. I have but one feeling, Nicias, or (shall I say?) two
feelings, about discussions. Some would think that I am a lover, and
to others I may seem to be a hater of discourse; for when I hear a man
discoursing of virtue, or of any sort of wisdom, who is a true man and
worthy of his theme, I am delighted beyond measure: and I compare
the man and his words, and note the harmony and correspondence of
them. And such an one I deem to be the true musician, attuned to a
fairer harmony than that of the lyre, or any pleasant instrument of
music; for truly he has in his own life a harmony of words and deeds
arranged, not in the Ionian, or in the Phrygian mode, nor yet in the
Lydian, but in the true Hellenic mode, which is the Dorian, and no
other. Such an one makes me merry with the sound of his voice; and
when I hear him I am thought to be a lover of discourse; so eager am I
in drinking in his words. But a man whose actions do not agree with
his words is an annoyance to me; and the better he speaks the more I
hate him, and then I seem to be a hater of discourse. As to
Socrates, I have no knowledge of his words, but of old, as would seem,
I have had experience of his deeds; and his deeds show that free and
noble sentiments are natural to him. And if his words accord, then I
am of one mind with him, and shall be delighted to be interrogated
by a man such as he is, and shall not be annoyed at having to learn of
him: for I too agree with Solon, "that I would fain grow old, learning
many things." But I must be allowed to add "of the good only."
Socrates must be willing to allow that he is a good teacher, or I
shall be a dull and uncongenial pupil: but that the teacher is
younger, or not as yet in repute-anything of that sort is of no
account with me. And therefore, Socrates, I give you notice that you
may teach and confute me as much as ever you like, and also learn of
me anything which I know. So high is the opinion which I have
entertained of you ever since the day on which you were my companion
in danger, and gave a proof of your valour such as only the man of
merit can give. Therefore, say whatever you like, and do not mind
about the difference of our ages.

  Soc. I cannot say that either of you show any reluctance to take
counsel and advise with me.

  Lys. But this is our proper business; and yours as well as ours, for
I reckon you as one of us. Please then to take my place, and find
out from Nicias and Laches what we want to know, for the sake of the
youths, and talk and consult with them: for I am old, and my memory is
bad; and I do not remember the questions which I am going to ask, or
the answers to them; and if there is any interruption I am quite lost.
I will therefore beg of you to carry on the proposed discussion by
yourselves; and I will listen, and Melesias and I will act upon your
conclusions.

  Soc. Let us, Nicias and Laches, comply with the request of
Lysimachus and Melesias. There will be no harm in asking ourselves the
question which was first proposed to us: "Who have been our own
instructors in this sort of training, and whom have we made better?"
But the other mode of carrying on the enquiry will bring us equally to
the same point, and will be more like proceeding from first
principles. For if we knew that the addition of something would
improve some other thing, and were able to make the addition, then,
clearly, we must know how that about which we are advising may be best
and most easily attained. Perhaps you do not understand what I mean.
Then let me make my meaning plainer in this way. Suppose we knew
that the addition of sight makes better the eyes which possess this
gift, and also were able to impart sight to the eyes, then, clearly,
we should know the nature of sight, and should be able to advise how
this gift of sight may be best and most easily attained; but if we
knew neither what sight is, nor what hearing is, we should not be very
good medical advisers about the eyes or the ears, or about the best
mode of giving sight and hearing to them.

  La. That is true, Socrates.