courage? Do you now understand what I mean?

  La. Not over well.

  Soc. I mean this: As I might ask what is that quality which is
called quickness, and which is found in running, in playing the
lyre, in speaking, in learning, and in many other similar actions,
or rather which we possess in nearly every action that is worth
mentioning of arms, legs, mouth, voice, mind;-would you not apply
the term quickness to all of them?

  La. Quite true.

  Soc. And suppose I were to be asked by some one: What is that common
quality, Socrates, which, in all these uses of the word, you call
quickness? I should say the quality which accomplishes much in a
little time-whether in running, speaking, or in any other sort of
action.

  La. You would be quite correct.

  Soc. And now, Laches, do you try and tell me in like manner, What is
that common quality which is called courage, and which includes all
the various uses of the term when applied both to pleasure and pain,
and in all the cases to which I was just now referring?

  La. I should say that courage is a sort of endurance of the soul, if
I am to speak of the universal nature which pervades them all.

  Soc. But that is what we must do if we are to answer the question.
And yet I cannot say that every kind of endurance is, in my opinion,
to be deemed courage. Hear my reason: I am sure, Laches, that you
would consider courage to be a very noble quality.

  La. Most noble, certainly.

  Soc. And you would say that a wise endurance is also good and noble?

  La. Very noble.

  Soc. But what would you say of a foolish endurance? Is not that,
on the other hand, to be regarded as evil and hurtful?

  La. True.

  Soc. And is anything noble which is evil and hurtful?

  La. I ought not to say that, Socrates.

  Soc. Then you would not admit that sort of endurance to be
courage-for it is not noble, but courage is noble?

  La. You are right.

  Soc. Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is courage?

  La. True.

  Soc. But as to the epithet "wise,"-wise in what? In all things small
as well as great? For example, if a man shows the quality of endurance
in spending his money wisely, knowing that by spending he will acquire
more in the end, do you call him courageous?

  La. Assuredly not.

  Soc. Or, for example, if a man is a physician, and his son, or
some patient of his, has inflammation of the lungs, and begs that he
may be allowed to eat or drink something, and the other is firm and
refuses; is that courage?

  La. No; that is not courage at all, any more than the last.

  Soc. Again, take the case of one who endures in war, and is
willing to fight, and wisely calculates and knows that others will
help him, and that there will be fewer and inferior men against him
than there are with him; and suppose that he has also advantages of
position; would you say of such a one who endures with all this wisdom
and preparation, that he, or some man in the opposing army who is in
the opposite circumstances to these and yet endures and remains at his
post, is the braver?

  La. I should say that the latter, Socrates, was the braver.

  Soc. But, surely, this is a foolish endurance in comparison with the
other?

  La. That is true.

  Soc. Then you would say that he who in an engagement of cavalry
endures, having the knowledge of horsemanship, is not so courageous as
he who endures, having no such knowledge?

  La. So I should say.

  Soc. And he who endures, having a knowledge of the use of the sling,
or the bow, or of any other art, is not so courageous as he who
endures, not having such a knowledge?

  La. True.