Soc. And he who descends into a well, and dives, and holds out in
this or any similar action, having no knowledge of diving, or the
like, is, as you would say, more courageous than those who have this
knowledge?

  La. Why, Socrates, what else can a man say?

  Soc. Nothing, if that be what he thinks.

  La. But that is what I do think.

  Soc. And yet men who thus run risks and endure are foolish,
Laches, in comparison of those who do the same things, having the
skill to do them.

  La. That is true.

  Soc. But foolish boldness and endurance appeared before to be base
and hurtful to us.

  La. Quite true.

  Soc. Whereas courage was acknowledged to be a noble quality.

  La. True.

  Soc. And now on the contrary we are saying that the foolish
endurance, which was before held in dishonour, is courage.

  La. Very true.

  Soc. And are we right in saying so?

  La. Indeed, Socrates, I am sure that we are not right.

  Soc. Then according to your statement, you and I, Laches, are not
attuned to the Dorian mode, which is a harmony of words and deeds; for
our deeds are not in accordance with our words. Any one would say that
we had courage who saw us in action, but not, I imagine, he who
heard us talking about courage just now.

  La. That is most true.

  Soc. And is this condition of ours satisfactory?

  La. Quite the reverse.

  Soc. Suppose, however, that we admit the principle of which we are
speaking to a certain extent.

  La. To what extent and what principle do you mean?

  Soc. The principle of endurance. We too must endure and persevere in
the enquiry, and then courage will not laugh at our faintheartedness
in searching for courage; which after all may, very likely, be
endurance.

  La. I am ready to go on, Socrates; and yet I am unused to
investigations of this sort. But the spirit of controversy has been
aroused in me by what has been said; and I am really grieved at
being thus unable to-express my meaning. For I fancy that I do know
the nature of courage; but, somehow or other, she has slipped away
from me, and I cannot get hold of her and tell her nature.

  Soc. But, my dear friend, should not the good sportsman follow the
track, and not be lazy?

  La. Certainly, he should.

  Soc. And shall we invite Nicias to join us? he may be better at
the sport than we are. What do you say?

  La. I should like that.

  Soc. Come then, Nicias, and do what you can to help your friends,
who are tossing on the waves of argument, and at the last gasp: you
see our extremity, and may save us and also settle your own opinion,
if you will tell us what you think about courage.

  Nic. I have been thinking, Socrates, that you and Laches are not
defining courage in the right way; for you have forgotten an excellent
saying which I have heard from your own lips.

  Soc. What is it, Nicias?

  Nic. I have often heard you say that "Every man is good in that in
which he is wise, and bad in that in which he is unwise."

  Soc. That is certainly true, Nicias.

  Nic. And therefore if the brave man is good, he is also wise.

  Soc. Do you hear him, Laches?

  La. Yes, I hear him, but I do not very well understand him.

  Soc. I think that I understand him; and he appears to me to mean
that courage is a sort of wisdom.

  La. What can he possibly mean, Socrates?