be, they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on
this he who would answer the question, "What is virtue?" would do well
to have his eye fixed: Do you understand?

  Men. I am beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold
of the question as I could wish.

  Soc. When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man,
another of a woman, another of a child, and so on, does this apply
only to virtue, or would you say the same of health, and size, and
strength? Or is the nature of health always the same, whether in man
or woman?

  Men. I should say that health is the same, both in man and woman.

  Soc. And is not this true of size and strength? If a woman is
strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and of the
same strength subsisting in her which there is in the man. I mean to
say that strength, as strength, whether of man or woman, is the
same. Is there any difference?

  Men. I think not.

  Soc. And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in a child
or in a grown-up person, in a woman or in a man?

  Men. I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is different
from the others.

  Soc. But why? Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was to
order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house?

  Men. I did say so.

  Soc. And can either house or state or anything be well ordered
without temperance and without justice?

  Men. Certainly not.

  Soc. Then they who order a state or a house temperately or justly
order them with temperance and justice?

  Men. Certainly.

  Soc. Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and
women, must have the same virtues of temperance and justice?

  Men. True.

  Soc. And can either a young man or an elder one be good, if they are
intemperate and unjust?

  Men. They cannot.

  Soc. They must be temperate and just?

  Men. Yes.

  Soc. Then all men are good in the same way, and by participation
in the same virtues?

  Men. Such is the inference.

  Soc. And they surely would not have been good in the same way,
unless their virtue had been the same?

  Men. They would not.

  Soc. Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been proven, try
and remember what you and Gorgias say that virtue is.

  Men. Will you have one definition of them all?

  Soc. That is what I am seeking.

  Men. If you want to have one definition of them all, I know not what
to say, but that virtue is the power of governing mankind.

  Soc. And does this definition of virtue include all virtue? Is
virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the child
govern his father, or the slave his master; and would he who
governed be any longer a slave?

  Men. I think not, Socrates.

  Soc. No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. Yet once more,
fair friend; according to you, virtue is "the power of governing"; but
do you not add "justly and not unjustly"?

  Men. Yes, Socrates; I agree there; for justice is virtue.

  Soc. Would you say "virtue," Meno, or "a virtue"?

  Men. What do you mean?

  Soc. I mean as I might say about anything; that a round, for
example, is "a figure" and not simply "figure," and I should adopt
this mode of speaking, because there are other figures.

  Men. Quite right; and that is just what I am saying about