Soc. And if one man is not better than another in desiring good,
he must be better in the power of attaining it?

  Men. Exactly.

  Soc. Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be
the power of attaining good?

  Men. I entirely approve, Socrates, of the manner in which you now
view this matter.

  Soc. Then let us see whether what you say is true from another point
of view; for very likely you may be right:-You affirm virtue to be the
power of attaining goods?

  Men. Yes.

  Soc. And the goods which mean are such as health and wealth and
the possession of gold and silver, and having office and honour in the
state-those are what you would call goods?

  Men. Yes, I should include all those.

  Soc. Then, according to Meno, who is the hereditary friend of the
great king, virtue is the power of getting silver and gold; and
would you add that they must be gained piously, justly, or do you deem
this to be of no consequence? And is any mode of acquisition, even
if unjust and dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue?

  Men. Not virtue, Socrates, but vice.

  Soc. Then justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part of
virtue, as would appear, must accompany the acquisition, and without
them the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue.

  Men. Why, how can there be virtue without these?

  Soc. And the non-acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest
manner for oneself or another, or in other words the want of them, may
be equally virtue?

  Men. True.

  Soc. Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the
non-acquisition and want of them, but whatever is accompanied by
justice or honesty is virtue, and whatever is devoid of justice is
vice.

  Men. It cannot be otherwise, in my judgment.

  Soc. And were we not saying just now that justice, temperance, and
the like, were each of them a part of virtue?

  Men. Yes.

  Soc. And so, Meno, this is the way in which you mock me.

  Men. Why do you say that, Socrates?

  Soc. Why, because I asked you to deliver virtue into my hands
whole and unbroken, and I gave you a pattern according to which you
were to frame your answer; and you have forgotten already, and tell me
that virtue is the power of attaining good justly, or with justice;
and justice you acknowledge to be a part of virtue.

  Men. Yes.

  Soc. Then it follows from your own admissions, that virtue is
doing what you do with a part of virtue; for justice and the like
are said by you to be parts of virtue.

  Men. What of that?

  Soc. What of that! Why, did not I ask you to tell me the nature of
virtue as a whole? And you are very far from telling me this; but
declare every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue;
as though you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue,
and this too when frittered away into little pieces. And, therefore,
my dear I fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question:
What is virtue? for otherwise, I can only say, that every action
done with a part of virtue is virtue; what else is the meaning of
saying that every action done with justice is virtue? Ought I not to
ask the question over again; for can any one who does not know
virtue know a part of virtue?

   Men. No; I do not say that he can.

   Soc. Do you remember how, in the example of figure, we rejected any
answer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted?

   Men. Yes, Socrates; and we were quite right in doing so.

   Soc. But then, my friend, do not suppose that we can explain to any
one the nature of virtue as a whole through some unexplained portion
of virtue, or anything at all in that fashion; we should only have
to ask over again the old question, What is virtue? Am I not right?

   Men. I believe that you are.