hereafter.

  Most true.

  But are there any modes of partaking of being other than these?

  There are none.

  Then the one cannot possibly partake of being?

  That is the inference.

  Then the one is not at all?

  Clearly not.

  Then the one does not exist in such way as to be one; for if it were
and partook of being, it would already be; but if the argument is to
be trusted, the one neither is nor is one?

  True.

  But that which is not admits of no attribute or relation?

  Of course not.

  Then there is no name, nor expression, nor perception, nor
opinion, nor knowledge of it?

  Clearly not.

  Then it is neither named, nor expressed, nor opined, nor known,
nor does anything that is perceive it.

  So we must infer.

  But can all this be true about the one?

  I think not.

  Suppose, now, that we return once more to the original hypothesis;
let us see whether, on a further review, any new aspect of the
question appears.

  I shall be very happy to do so.

  We say that we have to work out together all the consequences,
whatever they may be, which follow, if the one is?

  Yes.

  Then we will begin at the beginning:-If one is, can one be, and
not partake of being?

  Impossible.

  Then the one will have being, but its being will not be the same
with the one; for if the same, it would not be the being of the one;
nor would the one have participated in being, for the proposition that
one is would have been identical with the proposition that one is one;
but our hypothesis is not if one is one, what will follow, but if
one is:-am I not right?

  Quite right.

  We mean to say, that being has not the same significance as one?

  Of course.

  And when we put them together shortly, and say "One is," that is
equivalent to saying, "partakes of being"?

  Quite true.

  Once more then let us ask, if one is what will follow. Does not this
hypothesis necessarily imply that one is of such a nature as to have
parts?

  How so?

  In this way:-If being is predicated of the one, if the one is, and
one of being, if being is one; and if being and one are not the
same; and since the one, which we have assumed, is, must not the
whole, if it is one, itself be, and have for its parts, one and being?

  Certainly.

  And is each of these parts-one and being to be simply called a part,
or must the word "part" be relative to the word "whole"?

  The latter.

  Then that which is one is both a whole and has a part?

  Certainly.

  Again, of the parts of the one, if it is-I mean being and one-does
either fail to imply the other? is the one wanting to being, or
being to the one?