distributed by being, must also be many?

  Certainly.

  Further, inasmuch as the parts are parts of a whole, the one, as a
whole, will be limited; for are not the parts contained the whole?

  Certainly.

  And that which contains, is a limit?

  Of course.

  Then the one if it has being is one and many, whole and parts,
having limits and yet unlimited in number?

  Clearly.

  And because having limits, also having extremes?

  Certainly.

  And if a whole, having beginning and middle and end. For can
anything be a whole without these three? And if any one of them is
wanting to anything, will that any longer be a whole?

  No.

  Then the one, as appears, will have beginning, middle, and end.

  It will.

  But, again, the middle will be equidistant from the extremes; or
it would not be in the middle?

  Yes.

  Then the one will partake of figure, either rectilinear or round, or
a union of the two?

  True.

  And if this is the case, it will be both in itself and in another
too.

  How?

  Every part is in the whole, and none is outside the whole.

  True.

  And all the parts are contained by the whole?

  Yes.

  And the one is all its parts, and neither more nor less than all?

  No.

  And the one is the whole?

  Of course.

  But if all the parts are in the whole, and the one is all of them
and the whole, and they are all contained by the whole, the one will
be contained by the one; and thus the one will be in itself.

  That is true.

  But then, again, the whole is not in the parts-neither in all the
parts, nor in some one of them. For if it is in all, it must be in
one; for if there were any one in which it was not, it could not be in
all the parts; for the part in which it is wanting is one of all,
and if the whole is not in this, how can it be in them all?

  It cannot.

  Nor can the whole be in some of the parts; for if the whole were
in some of the parts, the greater would be in the less, which is
impossible.

  Yes, impossible.

  But if the whole is neither in one, nor in more than one, nor in all
of the parts, it must be in something else, or cease to be anywhere at
all?

  Certainly.

  If it were nowhere, it would be nothing; but being a whole, and
not being in itself, it must be in another.

  Very true.

  The one then, regarded as a whole, is in another, but regarded as
being all its parts, is in itself; and therefore the one must be
itself in itself and also in another.

  Certainly.