and unlikeness in them; for if they were like and unlike, or had in
them likeness and unlikeness, they would have two natures in them
opposite to one another.

  That is clear.

  But for that which partakes of nothing to partake of two things
was held by us to be impossible?

  Impossible.

  Then the others are neither like nor unlike nor both, for if they
were like or unlike they would partake of one of those two natures,
which would be one thing, and if they were both they would partake
of opposites which would be two things, and this has been shown to
be impossible.

  True.

  Therefore they are neither the same, nor other, nor in motion, nor
at rest, nor in a state of becoming, nor of being destroyed, nor
greater, nor less, nor equal, nor have they experienced anything
else of the sort; for, if they are capable of experiencing any such
affection, they will participate in one and two and three, and odd and
even, and in these, as has been proved, they do not participate,
seeing that they are altogether and in every way devoid of the one.

  Very true.

  Therefore if one is, the one is all things, and also nothing, both
in relation to itself and to other things.

  Certainly.

  Well, and ought we not to consider next what will be the consequence
if the one is not?

  Yes; we ought.

  What is the meaning of the hypothesis-If the one is not; is there
any difference between this and the hypothesis-If the not one is not?

  There is a difference, certainly.

  Is there a difference only, or rather are not the two expressions-if
the one is not, and if the not one is not, entirely opposed?

  They are entirely opposed.

  And suppose a person to say:-If greatness is not, if smallness is
not, or anything of that sort, does he not mean, whenever he uses such
an expression, that "what is not" is other than other things?

  To be sure.

  And so when he says "If one is not" he clearly means, that what
"is not" is other than all others; we know what he means-do we not?

  Yes, we do.

  When he says "one," he says something which is known; and secondly
something which is other than all other things; it makes no difference
whether he predicate of one being or not being, for that which is said
"not to be" is known to be something all the same, and is
distinguished from other things.

  Certainly.

  Then I will begin again, and ask: If one is not, what are the
consequences? In the first place, as would appear, there is a
knowledge of it, or the very meaning of the words, "if one is not,"
would not be known.

  True.

  Secondly, the others differ from it, or it could not be described as
different from the others?

  Certainly.

  Difference, then, belongs to it as well as knowledge; for in
speaking of the one as different from the others, we do not speak of a
difference in the others, but in the one.

  Clearly so.

  Moreover, the one that is not is something and partakes of
relation to "that," and "this," and "these," and the like, and is an
attribute of "this"; for the one, or the others than the one, could
not have been spoken of, nor could any attribute or relative of the
one that is not have been or been spoken of, nor could it have been
said to be anything, if it did not partake of "some," or of the
other relations just now mentioned.

  True.

  Being, then, cannot be ascribed to the one, since it is not; but the
one that is not may or rather must participate in many things, if it
and nothing else is not; if, however, neither the one nor the one that
is not is supposed not to be, and we are speaking of something of a