Clearly.

  Further, it must surely in a sort partake of being?

  How so?

  It must be so, for if not, then we should not speak the truth in
saying that the one is not. But if we speak the truth, clearly we must
say what is. Am I not right?

  Yes.

  And since we affirm that we speak truly, we must also affirm that we
say what is?

  Certainly.

  Then, as would appear, the one, when it is not, is; for if it were
not to be when it is not, but were to relinquish something of being,
so as to become not-being, it would at once be.

  Quite true.

  Then the one which is not, if it is to maintain itself, must have
the being of not-being as the bond of not-being, just as being must
have as a bond the not-being of not-being in order to perfect its
own being; for the truest assertion of the being of being and of the
not-being of not being is when being partakes of the being of being,
and not of the being of not-being-that is, the perfection of being;
and when not-being does not partake of the not-being of not-being
but of the being of not-being-that is the perfection of not-being.

  Most true.

  Since then what is partakes of not-being, and what is not of
being, must not the one also partake of being in order not to be?

  Certainly.

  Then the one, if it is not, clearly has being?

  Clearly.

  And has not-being also, if it is not?

  Of course.

  But can anything which is in a certain state not be in that state
without changing?

  Impossible.

  Then everything which is and is not in a certain state, implies
change?

  Certainly.

  And change is motion-we may say that?

  Yes, motion.

  And the one has been proved both to be and not to be?

  Yes.

  And therefore is and is not in the same state?

  Yes.

  Thus the one that is not has been shown to have motion also, because
it changes from being to not-being?

  That appears to be true.

  But surely if it is nowhere among what is, as is the fact, since
it is not, it cannot change from one place to another?

  Impossible.

  Then it cannot move by changing place?

  No.

  Nor can it turn on the same spot, for it nowhere touches the same,
for the same is, and that which is not cannot be reckoned among things
that are?

  It cannot.

  Then the one, if it is not, cannot turn in that in which it is not?

  No.

  Neither can the one, whether it is or is not, be altered into
other than itself, for if it altered and became different from itself,
then we could not be still speaking of the one, but of something else?

  True.