True, he said; and therefore when ideas are what they are in
relation to one another, their essence is determined by a relation
among themselves, and has nothing to do with the resemblances, or
whatever they are to be termed, which are in our sphere, and from
which we receive this or that name when we partake of them. And the
things which are within our sphere and have the same names with
them, are likewise only relative to one another, and not to the
ideas which have the same names with them, but belong to themselves
and not to them.

  What do you mean? said Socrates.

  I may illustrate my meaning in this way, said Parmenides:-A master
has a slave; now there is nothing absolute in the relation between
them, which is simply a relation of one man to another. But there is
also an idea of mastership in the abstract, which is relative to the
idea of slavery in the abstract. These natures have nothing to do with
us, nor we with them; they are concerned with themselves only, and
we with ourselves. Do you see my meaning?

  Yes, said Socrates, I quite see your meaning.

  And will not knowledge-I mean absolute knowledge-answer to
absolute truth?

  Certainly.

  And each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of
absolute being?

  Yes.

  But the knowledge which we have, will answer to the truth which we
have; and again, each kind of knowledge which we have, will be a
knowledge of each kind of being which we have?

  Certainly.

  But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and cannot
have?

  No, we cannot.

  And the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the
absolute idea of knowledge?

  Yes.

  And we have not got the idea of knowledge?

  No.

  Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share
in absolute knowledge?

  I suppose not.

  Then the nature of the beautiful in itself, and of the good in
itself, and all other ideas which we suppose to exist absolutely,
are unknown to us?

  It would seem so.

  I think that there is a stranger consequence still.

  What is it?

  Would you, or would you not say, that absolute knowledge, if there
is such a thing, must be a far more exact knowledge than our
knowledge; and the same of beauty and of the rest?

  Yes.

  And if there be such a thing as participation in absolute knowledge,
no one is more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge?

  Certainly.

  But then, will God, having absolute knowledge, have a knowledge of
human things?

  Why not?

  Because, Socrates, said Parmenides, we have admitted that the
ideas are not valid in relation to human things; nor human things in
relation to them; the relations of either are limited to their
respective spheres.

  Yes, that has been admitted.

  And if God has this perfect authority, and perfect knowledge, his
authority cannot rule us, nor his knowledge know us, or any human
thing; just as our authority does not extend to the gods, nor our
knowledge know anything which is divine, so by parity of reason
they, being gods, are not our masters, neither do they know the things
of men.

  Yet, surely, said Socrates, to deprive God of knowledge is
monstrous.