report of him, said, that he himself and Aristoteles and the whole
company entreated Parmenides to give an example of the process. I
cannot refuse, said Parmenides; and yet I feel rather like Ibycus,
who, when in his old age, against his will, he fell in love,
compared himself to an old racehorse, who was about to run in a
chariot race, shaking with fear at the course he knew so well-this was
his simile of himself. And I also experience a trembling when I
remember through what an ocean of words I have to wade at my time of
life. But I must indulge you, as Zeno says that I ought, and we are
alone. Where shall I begin? And what shall be our first hypothesis, if
I am to attempt this laborious pastime? Shall I begin with myself, and
take my own hypothesis the one? and consider the consequences which
follow on the supposition either of the being or of the not being of
one?

  By all means, said Zeno.

  And who will answer me? he said. Shall I propose the youngest? He
will not make difficulties and will be the most likely to say what
he thinks; and his answers will give me time to breathe.

  I am the one whom you mean, Parmenides, said Aristoteles; for I am
the youngest and at your service. Ask, and I will answer.

  Parmenides proceeded: If one is, he said, the one cannot be many?

  Impossible.

  Then the one cannot have parts, and cannot be a whole?

  Why not?

  Because every part is part of a whole; is it not?

  Yes.

  And what is a whole? would not that of which no part is wanting be a
whole?

  Certainly.

  Then, in either case, the one would be made up of parts; both as
being a whole, and also as having parts?

  To be sure.

  And in either case, the one would be many, and not one?

  True.

  But, surely, it ought to be one and not many?

  It ought.

  Then, if the one is to remain one, it will not be a whole, and
will not have parts?

  No.

  But if it has no parts, it will have neither beginning, middle,
nor end; for these would of course be parts of it.

  Right.

  But then, again, a beginning and an end are the limits of
everything?

  Certainly.

  Then the one, having neither beginning nor end, is unlimited?

  Yes, unlimited.

  And therefore formless; for it cannot partake either of round or
straight.

  But why?

  Why, because the round is that of which all the extreme points are
equidistant from the centre?

  Yes.

  And the straight is that of which the centre intercepts the view
of the extremes?

  True.

  Then the one would have parts and would be many, if it partook
either of a straight or of a circular form?

  Assuredly.

  But having no parts, it will be neither straight nor round?

  Right.

  And, being of such a nature, it cannot be in any place, for it
cannot be either in another or in itself.