How so?

  Because if it were in another, it would be encircled by that in
which it was, and would touch it at many places and with many parts;
but that which is one and indivisible, and does not partake of a
circular nature, cannot be touched all round in many places.

  Certainly not.

  But if, on the other hand, one were in itself, it would also be
contained by nothing else but itself; that is to say, if it were
really in itself; for nothing can be in anything which does not
contain it.

  Impossible.

  But then, that which contains must be other than that which is
contained? for the same whole cannot do and suffer both at once; and
if so, one will be no longer one, but two?

  True.

  Then one cannot be anywhere, either in itself or in another?

  No.

  Further consider, whether that which is of such a nature can have
either rest or motion.

  Why not?

  Why, because the one, if it were moved, would be either moved in
place or changed in nature; for these are the only kinds of motion.

  Yes.

  And the one, when it changes and ceases to be itself, cannot be
any longer one.

  It cannot.

  It cannot therefore experience the sort of motion which is change of
nature?

  Clearly not.

  Then can the motion of the one be in place?

  Perhaps.

  But if the one moved in place, must it not either move round and
round in the same place, or from one place to another?

  It must.

  And that which moves in a circle must rest upon a centre; and that
which goes round upon a centre must have parts which are different
from the centre; but that which has no centre and no parts cannot
possibly be carried round upon a centre?

  Impossible.

  But perhaps the motion of the one consists in change of place?

  Perhaps so, if it moves at all.

  And have we not already shown that it cannot be in anything?

  Yes.

  Then its coming into being in anything is still more impossible;
is it not?

  I do not see why.

  Why, because anything which comes into being in anything, can
neither as yet be in that other thing while still coming into being,
nor be altogether out of it, if already coming into being in it.

  Certainly not.

  And therefore whatever comes into being in another must have
parts, and then one part may be in, and another part out of that
other; but that which has no parts can never be at one and the same
time neither wholly within nor wholly without anything.

  True.

  And is there not a still greater impossibility in that which has
no parts, and is not a whole, coming into being anywhere, since it
cannot come into being either as a part or as a whole?

  Clearly.

  Then it does not change place by revolving in the same spot, not
by going somewhere and coming into being in something; nor again, by
change in itself?

  Very true.