Well; and may you not also from seeing the picture of a horse or a
lyre remember a man? and from the picture of Simmias, you may be led
to remember Cebes?

  True.

  Or you may also be led to the recollection of Simmias himself?

  True, he said.

  And in all these cases, the recollection may be derived from
things either like or unlike?

  That is true.

  And when the recollection is derived from like things, then there is
sure to be another question, which is, whether the likeness of that
which is recollected is in any way defective or not.

  Very true, he said.

  And shall we proceed a step further, and affirm that there is such a
thing as equality, not of wood with wood, or of stone with stone,
but that, over and above this, there is equality in the abstract?
Shall we affirm this?

  Affirm, yes, and swear to it, replied Simmias, with all the
confidence in life.

  And do we know the nature of this abstract essence?

  To be sure, he said.

  And whence did we obtain this knowledge? Did we not see equalities
of material things, such as pieces of wood and stones, and gather from
them the idea of an equality which is different from them?-you will
admit that? Or look at the matter again in this way: Do not the same
pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal, and at another
time unequal?

  That is certain.

  But are real equals ever unequal? or is the idea of equality ever
inequality?

  That surely was never yet known, Socrates.

  Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea of
equality?

  I should say, clearly not, Socrates.

  And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea of
equality, you conceived and attained that idea?

  Very true, he said.

  Which might be like, or might be unlike them?

  Yes.

  But that makes no difference; whenever from seeing one thing you
conceived another, whether like or unlike, there must surely have been
an act of recollection?

  Very true.

  But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other
material equals? and what is the impression produced by them? Are they
equals in the same sense as absolute equality? or do they fall short
of this in a measure?

  Yes, he said, in a very great measure, too.

  And must we not allow that when I or anyone look at any object,
and perceive that the object aims at being some other thing, but falls
short of, and cannot attain to it-he who makes this observation must
have had previous knowledge of that to which, as he says, the other,
although similar, was inferior?

  Certainly.

  And has not this been our case in the matter of equals and of
absolute equality?

  Precisely.

  Then we must have known absolute equality previously to the time
when we first saw the material equals, and reflected that all these
apparent equals aim at this absolute equality, but fall short of it?

  That is true.

  And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only been
known, and can only be known, through the medium of sight or touch, or
of some other sense. And this I would affirm of all such conceptions.

  Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of them is
the same as the other.